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The paper discusses the condition and perspective of the European Union in the knowledge economy and the 
feasibility of the goal given by the European Council at the Summits held in Lisbon (March 2000) and Barcelona 
(March 2002), that is, to increase European R&D expenditure up to 3 percent of GDP by 2010. The paper focuses on 
two aspects: comparative performance with its direct counterparts, in particular the US..; and intra-European 
distribution of resources and capabilities. A set of technological indicators is presented to show that Europe is still in 
a consistent delay when compared to Japan and the U.S., especially in R&D investment and in the generation of 
innovations. A small convergence occurs in the diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), 
the sector most directly linked to the concept of the “new economy.” In the field of knowledge collaboration, Europe 
reveals opposing paths in the business and in the academic worlds. Within Europe, the level of investment in 
scientific and technological activities is so different across countries that it does not merge into a single continental 
innovation system. 
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Introduction 
At the Lisbon Summit in March 2000, the European Council declared its intention of making the 
European Research Area (ERA) the greatest knowledge economy in the world. At the Barcelona Summit 
in March 2002 it was stated that Europe should reach a ratio of R&D to GDP equal to 3 percent by 2010. 
How realistic are these targets? And, how is Europe doing in the technological race five years after the 
first announcement of these goals? 
The aim of this paper is to present some evidence on the dynamics of technological change in 
Europe, compared to the performance of its direct competitors, the United States and Japan. It is often ar-
gued that a new cluster of innovations, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), and associ-
ated productivity growth are leading us into a “new economy” that will deliver an expansion of employ-
ment and improved standards of living (for an overview, see Temple, 2002). On the basis of the impres-
sive performance of the U.S. economy in the 1990s, it has often been suggested that the wealth of nations 
will rely on their ability to adjust to these transformations, and that those countries not able to adjust will 
be marginalized and will lose the competitive race. The accompanying prediction says that Europe will 
have slower long-term economic growth than the U.S. because of its insufficient effort at adjusting to the 
rules of the “new economy” (Daveri, 2002). In other words, if the old continent continues to lag behind 
the U.S. and Japan in technological dynamism, this could jeopardize the achievement of the “European 
dream” in domains such as welfare, public education and health care (see Rifkin, 2004); hence the need to 
upgrade, in the most aggressive way, the European knowledge base. 
The idea that there is a “new” economy is certainly fascinating, and it is not surprising that it has 
been so prominent in the business world, in the political community and in the press. John Maynard 
Keynes knew very well that expectations play a fundamental role in fostering the business cycle, and the 
hope that something so intriguing as a “new” economy could be with us has helped some corporations to 
support their stock market prices, some politicians to be elected or re-elected, and the media to increase 
their sales. 
The academic community is certainly not immune from these tendencies, although its function 
should be to take ideas that have spread too quickly with a pinch of salt,
1 and it is no surprise that a good 
share of the optimism vanished with the stock market recession that began in September 2000. A dose of 
skepticism does not imply sharing the belief that there is nothing new under the sun: now and then some-
thing new does occur in economic and social life. Major changes have taken place in the last decade and 
some key components can be singled out, in particular: 
1) The exploitation of knowledge has become more and more systematic, with an increasing pro-
pensity by business companies to search out profit and growth opportunities in the exploitation of know-
how (Granstrand, 1999; Suarez-Villa, 2000). 
2) The transfer across space of commodities, financial resources, expertise and information has 
become much easier; while technical feasibility has increased exponentially, economic costs have been 
dramatically reduced (Antonelli, 2001; Freeman and Louca, 2001; Held and McGrew, 1999). 
3) The number of players able to enter into old and new fields has also increased, leading to an 
accelerated pace of economic competition (Mowery and Nelson, 1999). 
These three aspects combined have something in common with what has been labelled a “new 
economy,” but we have included in the definition neither the assumption that ICTs will automatically 
translate into steady productivity growth nor that stock market values should increase spectacularly (see 
Freeman, 2001). In fact, scholars who study long-term economic and social development have preferred 
to use terms such as “knowledge-based economy,” which emphasizes the role played by know-how and 
                                           
1For a critical assessment of the over-optimism about the new economy, see Freeman (2001).    3
competencies in the economic sphere. We prefer to use the term “globalizing learning economy” (Lund-
vall and Borras, 1998; Archibugi and Lundvall, 2001), since this seems better to capture the key role 
played by human learning in the economic and social landscape and to connect technological innovations 
to the social infrastructures and competencies needed to exploit them. The term “globalizing” (rather than 
“global” or even “globalized”) should help to remind us that the vast majority of the world’s population 
of the world is still excluded from access to know-how that has already become obsolete in other parts of 
the globe (UNDP, 2001). 
Whatever term we use, we have to face a new reality: long-term economic growth, employment 
and welfare on the old continent will be more and more associated with its capability to generate, acquire 
and diffuse new knowledge. It is therefore not surprising that there is a major policy concern within gov-
ernments, businesses and trade unions about ways to promote scientific and technological activities, to 
foster innovation in firms, and to upgrade the competencies of human resources. These are seen as key 
conditions for increasing employment and retaining market shares in an enhanced competitive world 
economy.  
This is eloquently reflected in the so-called “Lisbon Strategy,” which focuses on a wide range of 
topics but puts the “knowledge economy” at the core of its economic policy. The European Council in 
Lisbon (March 2000) set the strategic goal for the next decade “to become the most dynamic and com-
petitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment.” The European Council in Barce-
lona (March 2002) further quantified these targets and agreed that “overall spending on R&D and innova-
tion in the Union should be increased with the aim of approaching 3 percent of GDP by 2010. Two-thirds 
of this new investment should come from the private sector.”
2 
These targets certainly go in the right direction, but it must also be stressed that they are very am-
bitious (for an assessment, see Soete, 2002; Schibany and Streicher, 2003; European Commission, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the European Summits have not been sufficiently explicit about the instruments made 
available and some basic questions remain unaddressed (for a much needed attempt to assess the Lisbon 
Strategy, see the Kok Report, 2004). In particular: a) how will the private sector be induced to increase its 
own R&D so substantially? b) how should the growth in R&D be distributed among the various member 
countries? c) what role should individual governments and European Commission institutions play? 
In order to develop a proper innovation strategy, Europe must face the fact that it is composed of 
a number of states which retain substantial autonomy.
3 What the old continent is gaining in terms of vari-
ety and diversity, it is losing because of lack of cohesion and central policy decision making. Europe is an 
agglomeration of different innovation systems. While some regions of the European Union are strongly 
integrated in knowledge transmission, others continue to be peripheral and excluded by major technology 
transfer flows. The recent enlargement from EU15 to EU25 has definitely increased the variety of inno-
vation systems. One of the core issues that should be addressed both at the national and at the European 
policy level, therefore, is how to integrate the different local and national components into a single inno-
vative system comparable to the American or the Japanese one. 
While all capitalist economies are undergoing the transformations associated with the knowledge-
based economy, Europe is also engaged in major institutional changes. For decades European integration 
was driven by a variety of common policies such as a custom unions, a common agricultural policy and, 
more recently, a common monetary policy. But despite the efforts undertaken with the various multi-
annual Framework Programmes since the early 1980s, European integration is not yet driven by science 
                                           
2All documentation on the Lisbon Strategy is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/index_en.html 
3Amable and Petit (2001), Maurseth and Verspagen (1999), Garcia-Fontes and Geuna (1999) and, more broadly, the chapters 
collected in Archibugi and Lundvall (2001) present some evidence and considerations about the lack of a proper European Inno-
vation System.    4
and technology policy. No more than 4.6 percent of the European Commission’s total budget is devoted 
to Research and Technological Development (RTD), and this accounts for less than 6 percent of the total 
amount spent by EU governments on RTD (Sharp, 2001). In spite of the growing amount of resources that 
the EU has dedicated to RTD, this is still a small portion of the budget. Science policy is one of the many 
fields where “European inertia” is dominant (see Banchoff, 2002). 
In the next section we present a broad set of data describing the technological status of Europe, 
with regard both to investments – by means of the expenditure on R&D – and to performance in innova-
tive activities – by means of other technological indicators. We compare EU15 and EU25 with North 
America and Japan, and we highlight recent evolution. Particular attention is devoted to ICTs, since this 
sector is more strictly linked to the concept of the “new economy” and it represents the main infrastruc-
ture of the knowledge society. In a following section we analyze the phenomenon of scientific and tech-
nological collaboration since we assume, on the one hand, that it reveals a lot about the “attractiveness” of 
various regions of the world and, on the other hand, that it is a key policy asset for designing an EU strat-
egy. Finally, in the last section, we discuss the strategies Europe is using to achieve a more prominent role 
in the globalizing learning economy. 
 
I. Which News about the European Technology Gap? 
Like North America and Japan, Europe is a leading player in the generation of scientific and tech-
nological competencies. The combined R&D budget of the EU25 is more than two-thirds that of the U.S. 
one, and nearly the double that of Japan. In terms of scientific articles, the output of the EU is substan-
tially higher than the U.S.’s, but this strongly reflects the size of the EU, which has a population much 
larger than the U.S. or Japan (see Table 1). Tables 2 to 6 report intensities for advanced countries and they 
show that there are increasing signals that Europe is losing ground in the most dynamic and technologi-
cally advanced part of the economy. The evidence presented shows the performance of EU15 and EU25 
in comparison to the U.S., Japan and a few other advanced countries. The aim is to assess: a) the evolu-
tion over time of the three main geographical areas in the technological race; b) intra-European variety in 
technological expertise; and c) the occurrence of convergence or divergence within Europe. 
 
R&D and patents 
The concern about an increasing technological gap is certainly not new: as early as the 1960s we 
heard about “the American challenge” (Servan-Schreiber, 1968), and similar concerns were reiterated in 
the 1980s and in the 1990s (see, for example, Patel and Pavitt, 1987; Archibugi and Pianta, 1992). Europe 
is certainly not the only region concerned about its technological performance. Similar worries were 
echoed in America (Kennedy, 1988; Pianta, 1988; Nelson, 1989) and, if we were able to read Japanese, 
we would find comparable statements in the Far East as well. But saying that the neighbor’s grass is al-
ways greener cannot dismiss the issue of poor performance by the European economy in key aspects of 
knowledge-based production. 
Table 2 reports some data about R&D intensity. As regards gross R&D expenditure (GERD) as a 
percentage of GDP, the EU25 intensity is equal to 1.83 per cent, substantially lower than the U.S. (2.71) 
and Japan (3.11). In the second half of the 1990s Japanese R&D intensity grew more than in the U.S., 
while the intensity of the EU15 has grown very little. Within EU25, there emerges a clear divide between 
North and South. The country with the highest level, Sweden, has an R&D intensity that is almost eight 
times higher than the country with the lowest one, Latvia. Equally widespread gaps persist in the EU15. 
The coefficient of variations has held steady, indicating that there has not been overall convergence. 
A similar pattern emerges in terms of business R&D ( BERD) as a percentage of the Domestic 
Product of Industry (DPI), reported in the right-hand columns of Table 2. In this case, the difference be-  5
tween the first and the last EU25 country is even higher: Sweden has a BERD intensity twenty-five times 
higher than Poland. Some contrasting tendencies also emerge: industrial R&D has decreased in Eastern 
European countries such as Poland and Slovakia, while it has increased in almost all Western European 
countries. As a consequence, the coefficient of variation has increased for EU15 and, even more, for 
EU25. 
Table 3 shows the patents granted in the U.S. and applied for in Europe per million people. Over-
all, the data show a remarkable increase in the number of patents at both Patent Offices as a consequence 
of the increasing competitiveness over intellectual property rights (see Andersen, 2004). For patents 
granted at the U.S. Patent Trademark Office (USPTO), the high ratio reflects the fact that inventors and 
firms are patenting in their own domestic market, but for Japan and European countries, it is reasonable to 
assume that they have a comparable propensity to patent in the U.S., since for both of them the U.S. is an 
economically crucial market. It emerges that Japan has a ratio more than four times higher than the EU25 
average. Not even the European countries with the highest propensity to patent, that is, Switzerland and 
Sweden, have the same intensity as Japan. Many European countries, both in the East and in the South, 
report no or negligible patent activity in the U.S. The dispersion within the EU is extraordinarily high. It 
is difficult to find other aspects of economic and social life where the distance between the top and the 
bottom European countries is so wide (on regional variations in the European Systems of Innovations, see 
Chesnais, Ietto and Simonetti, 2001; Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003). 
Patents granted in the U.S. are complemented by patent applications at the European Patent Of-
fice (EPO). Even in the European market, Japan has a patent propensity above the average of the members 
of the EU (respectively, 135 and 114 patents per million people), and the U.S. is also close to the EU av-
erage (107 patents per million people). The higher growth rates in patent applications at the EPO for both 
EU15 and EU25 shows that the construction of the European market is on its way, but with remarkable 
regional variations. Eastern and Southern countries do not yet seem to participate in the generation of 
commercially exploitable innovations. This is hardly surprising in light of the very low business R&D per-
formed. In Southern countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, business R&D seems to be limited 
mostly to imitation and learning. 
While patents reflect inventive and innovative activities that are proprietary in nature and mainly 
developed for commercial purposes, scientific literature informs mainly about the activities of the aca-
demic community. However, scientific literature has become more and more relevant for high-technology 
industries in the last few decades and it is an important source of industrial competitiveness (see Tijssen, 
2001). Table 4 reports the number of scientific and technical articles published in the sample of journals 
monitored by the Science Citation Index of the Institute for Scientific Information. It is often said that the 
Science Citation Index is biased in favor of the English-speaking academic community, and this is proba-
bly true, but many top-ranking countries are not-English speaking. In this aspect of S&T activity, the 
European gap with the U.S. is smaller. In terms of intensity, the EU25 average is below the U.S. (respec-
tively, 493 and 700 articles per million people) and above Japan (444 articles per million people), but 
EU25 scientific production has grown in recent years, while the U.S. scientific production has declined.  
Within EU25, the ratio between the highest (Sweden) and the lowest (Latvia) country is 17 to 1: 
the European dispersion in indicators of academic activities (mainly funded with public money) is sub-
stantially lower than for technological activities (mainly funded by business companies). Over time a lim-
ited convergence has occurred at both the EU15 and EU25 levels. This improved European performance 
in the area of academic activity reflects the overall satisfactory level of human resources, confirmed by 
the proportion of graduate or Ph.D students in science and technology (European Commission, 2003). 
Unfortunately, as shown by the Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators 
(European Commission, 2003), Europe does not easily succeed in turning this rich variety of human re-
sources into an adequate proportion of researchers in the work force, especially in the business world.   6
Many talents nurtured in Europe, with taxpayers’ resources, do not find adequate jobs on the continent, 
and often find it convenient to move to the other side of the Atlantic. 
Summing up, what does this battery of indicators tell us?  
  •  First, the evidence has allowed us to quantify how Europe is lagging behind the other two 
major areas, both for investment and performance in technology. In total R&D investment, Europe is even 
increasing the gap with Japan and not reducing it with the U.S. This is a particularly worrying signal since 
R&D is one of the main inputs for the generation of knowledge and therefore an engine of long-term eco-
nomic and social growth. 
  •  Second, the gap is more evident in business-related indicators than in publicly funded re-
search. The indicators of technological activities, such as business R&D and patents, provide mild signs of 
catching up. In scientific publications Europe is reducing its gap with the U.S. Other indicators on human 
resources (European Commission, 2003) confirm the impression of potentially good intellectual capital in 
the EU that does not translate into more researchers in the work force, especially in the industrial sector. 
  •  Third, there are huge differences among European countries. In almost all the indicators 
taken into account, a group of small- and medium-sized countries, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Denmark, show performance that is on a par with or even higher than the 
U.S. and Japan. Switzerland and Norway are not members of the EU, and the others are rather small to be 
able to “lift up” the EU average. 
  •  Fourth, it is evident that the integration of ten new member countries (plus the former 
East Germany [DDR]) has just started and that these countries are at a very different overall technological 
level from the EU15 group. Eastern countries such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary 
are on a par with and sometimes even above Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece, but the overall European area at the periphery of scientific and technological advance, so far 
limited to Southern Europe and Ireland, has now become larger. Growth rates in the ten new countries 
have, on average, been slightly higher than the EU15, but, overall, the low-tech area of the EU has con-
siderably increased. 
 
Challenges for Europe in ICT 
We now turn our attention to the ICT sector, the most closely associated with the new economy 
(Daveri, 2002). Here Europe, despite originally being laggard in comparison to the U.S. and Japan (see 
Gambardella and Malerba, 1999; Fagerberg, Guerrieri and Verspagen, 1999; Vivarelli and Pianta, 2000), 
is slowly catching up. Table 5 shows that the U.S. and Japan, respectively, invest 7.2 percent and 7.5 per-
cent of their GDP in ICT while EU25 invests 6.5 but, in the second half of the 1990s, EU25 continued to 
grow at an annual rate of 4.1 percent, higher than Japan (2.2 percent) and in the opposite direction from 
the U.S., which has experienced a decline (–1.7 percent). Within the EU, a mild but significant conver-
gence has occurred both among the fifteen and the twenty-five countries. The Eastern European countries 
for which data are available show an even greater growth rate. Consequently, EU25 dispersion has been 
substantially reduced. 
If we consider the composition of the ICT sector, while the 1980s experienced the dramatic rise of 
Japan and other East Asian economies in hardware technologies (for an overview, see Freeman, 1987; 
Mathews, 2000), in the 1990s the U.S. managed to recover its traditional economic leadership in 
knowledge-intensive industries by exploiting and disseminating ICT in the service sector. Within the triad, 
Japan and the other East Asian economies continue to have a prominent position in the generation of the 
“hardware” component, while the U.S. has a dominant position in the “software” one. Europe has neither. 
It should however be noted that Europe has recently augmented expenditure in the software area, follow-  7
ing a general trend towards so-called “weightlessness,” that is, the increase of the share of soft compo-
nents in ICT (Daveri 2002, European Informative Telecommunications Observatory, 2001).  
An indicator of the diffusion of technology complements these data: Internet penetration. In fact, 
ICT is important not only for the highest gain in productivity it directly performs, but also because, thanks 
to its diffusion, it enables other sectors to increase their productivity; in other words it entails positive ex-
ternalities. Besides, while both R&D and patent-based indicators capture the technological activities de-
veloped in the manufacturing industry, Internet use is an indicator that provides information on both the 
manufacturing and the service components of the economy. Table 6 shows that the penetration in the U.S. 
and Japan is much higher than in the EU. Although the EU is catching up, it is still at levels below its 
counterparts. In Europe, however, the Nordic countries have a higher penetration than the U.S. The ratio 
between the country with the highest (Sweden) and the lowest (Latvia) penetration is more than 4 to 1. 
Not surprisingly, the trend shows a marked convergence among EU countries, with Eastern European 
countries catching up. An indispensable infrastructure for the diffusion of knowledge like the Internet is 
essential to Eastern European countries to acquire technical expertise from the core countries. Summing 
up, in ICT Europe is delayed with respect to the U.S. and Japan but is reducing the gap. 
 
II. International Technological and Scientific Collaboration 
The section above has shown that intra-European variety in knowledge is very high, and some 
consistently developed regions are counter-balanced by others that are unable to generate the technologi-
cal innovations that they use. It therefore becomes crucial to identify the channels that allow the dissemi-
nation of technical expertise across the continent. One of them is represented by collaboration among eco-
nomic agents located in different regions. 
In the last decade, a new source of knowledge has become progressively more important: techno-
logical collaboration among firms. While the academic community has always had a tendency to share its 
knowledge with other partners, it was assumed that corporations were much more reluctant to share their 
know-how with potential competitors. The need to split the costs and risks of technological development, 
along with the need to acquire the expertise of other partners, have acted as strong motivation to under-
take strategic technology agreements. Strategic technology agreements are defined as: partnerships that a) 
involve a two-way relationship, b) tend to be contractual in nature with no or little equity involvement by 
the participants, and c) are strategic in the sense that they are long-term planned activity (Mytelka, 2001, 
p. 129). 
Strategic technology agreements are not only a source of knowledge; they also inform where 
companies seek expertise. Some evidence on the available statistics on inter-firm technological collabo-
ration is reported in Table 7, based on the database developed by John Hagedoorn and his colleagues (see 
Hagedoorn, 1996, National Science Foundation, 2002). As many as 60 percent of the total strategic tech-
nology alliances recorded are international in scope. This form of generating technological knowledge has 
considerably increased its significance, and the number of recorded agreements nearly tripled between 
1980-82 and 1998-2000. 
The largest and most increasing portion of alliances take place within the U.S.: 45.8 percent of all 
the strategic technological alliances recorded in 1998-2000 occured among American firms only, against 
24.6 percent in the 1980-82 period (NSF, 2002). Moreover, U.S. firms have strong ties on both the Atlan-
tic and the Pacific shores: in the 1998-2000 period, U.S. companies participated in as many as 84.7 per-
cent of the recorded technology alliances. On the contrary, the share of intra-European strategic techno-
logical alliances has substantially declined: they accounted for 18.2 percent in 1980-82, and less than 10 
percent in 1998-2000. They have even decreased in absolute terms in the last decade (from seventy-four 
in 1989-91 to fifty-three in 1998-2000).   8
European policymakers should be concerned by the strong propensity of European firms for 
American, rather than European, partnerships. It is not necessarily a bad thing that European firms have 
agreements with American ones, but it is certainly worrying that there are so few intra-European agree-
ments. Policies carried out at the European level, especially at the European Commission level, to foster 
cooperation in R&D and innovation on the continent, have not been able to push for a greater cohesion of 
European industry (Narula, 1999). The first possible explanation would be that the absolute amount of re-
sources devoted to science and technology is much greater in U.S. firms and that, obviously, firms engage 
in technology alliances with partners who have adequate expertise. The greater flow of alliances in the 
U.S. would therefore just be the outcome of the amount of investment in knowledge by U.S. companies. 
In order to control for this factor, we divided the number of European alliances undertaken by the total 
amount of, respectively, European, U.S. and Japanese business enterprises’ R&D expenditure (BERD). 
This provides an indicator of the propensity of European companies towards collaboration in each of 
these regions. The results are reported in Table 8. 
Although the attractiveness of the U.S. economy proves to be a bit smaller in relative terms, 
European companies’ greater propensity for American partnerships is confirmed. There are 1.07 
European-U.S. partnerships for each billion $U.S. BERD, while the equivalent figure for intra-European 
partnerships is just 0.62. Moreover, the European business community has considerably changed its pro-
pensity for partnership over the last ten years: in the 1980-82 and 1989-91 periods, European companies 
had a larger propensity for European rather than American partners. The figures were, respectively, 0.80 
and 0.61 agreements for each billion $U.S. BERD in 1980-82, and 1.03 and 0.86 in 1989-91. The lower 
part of Table 8 reports the propensity of American companies to undertake alliances. U.S. companies are 
now keener to embark on joint ventures with European partners, and this is a result of the overall increase 
of their engagement in collaborations, but internal partnerships continue to be relevant. If the new econ-
omy is represented – among other things – by strategic technology partnerships, the evidence suggests 
that this strongly leans towards the U.S. rather than towards Europe or Japan. 
Partnerships and collaborations promoted by public research institutions and universities play an 
equally crucial role in the international dissemination of knowledge. They can take a variety of forms: 
joint research centers, exchange of students and of academic staff, sharing of scientific information. One 
of the ways to measure this is by looking at internationally coauthored scientific papers. A dramatic in-
crease in internationally coauthored papers – also facilitated by the diffusion of the Internet and e-mail 
communication – is evident in all countries (Table 9). From 1986 to 2001, the percentage of internation-
ally coauthored papers has doubled in the majority of countries, and this represents a clear signal of glob-
alization in the generation of knowledge. European countries are individually keener to collaborate than 
the U.S. and Japan. This is not surprising, given the smaller size of the scientific community in each 
country. From a dynamic viewpoint, the rate of increase has been higher in the U.S. and Japan than in 
European countries, but this is due to the fact that the U.S. has lowered the growth of national scientific 
articles (see Table 4 above and NSF 2002, table 5.41). These data clearly show that the academic commu-
nity in Europe is a valuable asset for the acquisition of knowledge and expertise beyond the borders of 
countries. Eastern European countries, which in 1986 had limited access to collaboration outside their 
bloc, have started to undertake joint programs: in 2001, more than half of the scientific papers generated 
in Eastern Europe were the result of international collaboration, with an internationalization that is equal 
to, and sometimes even greater than, Western European countries of the same size. 
Does the academic community also share the same preference as European firms have for Ameri-
can rather than for European partners? Table 10 reports the distribution of internationally coauthored col-
laborations in the Triad.
4 EU15 is by far the greatest collaborator for the American academic community. 
In 1995-97 as many as 60.3 percent of U.S. internationally coauthored papers involved a EU15 partner. 
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Also, Europeans have a strong propensity to collaborate with each other. This fact could be misleading, 
since a paper coauthored by a Dutch and a Belgian is classified as “international,” while a paper coau-
thored by a Californian and a New Yorker is classified as national. But what is significant in these data is 
the evolution over time (and this is not affected by the different size of the countries): by comparing the 
first period (1986-88) to the last one (1995-97), it emerges that intra-EU collaborations are increasing in 
proportion (from 56.6 to 69.4 percent of all internationally coauthored papers), while EU-U.S. collabora-
tions are decreasing for the EU as a whole (from 31.9 to 29.0 percent) as well as for each EU15 member 
country. Looking at the data from an American perspective, the above tendency is enhanced: the share of 
intra-U.S. articles in all U.S. coauthored articles declines from 78 to 68 percent, while coauthorship with 
authors based in the EU15 has grown from 11 to 19 percent (National Science Foundation, 2000, table 
6.51). 
We therefore note an inverse tendency: the European business community has an increasing pro-
pensity for technological alliances with U.S. firms, while the European academic community has an in-
creasing propensity for intra-European partnership. One of the main policies used by the European Com-
mission in the last decade, through the instrument of the Framework Programmes, has been to promote 
collaborations among European institutions and firms. The data reported suggest that these policies have 
been much more successful in creating a European Research Area (ERA) in academia than in business. 
The limited resources the European Commission disposes of (about 4,000 million euro a year in the last 
approved Sixth Framework Programme) have not been enough to meet the needs of European industry, 
while they have proved to be more effective as regards training and the promotion of researchers’ mobil-
ity. 
There is a third important form of collaboration, which is between enterprises on one side, and 
universities on the other. The advantage of this kind of cooperation is that it allows a quick conversion of 
scientific knowledge into commercial applications with a direct and immediate economic return. One way 
to measure it is by looking at the share of university R&D financed by industry. The EU shows a little pro-
gress, but it still mantains a consistent delay, with respect to the U.S. and Japan, in the overall resources 
for financing R&D expenditure of universities, (European Commission, 2003; Garcia-Fontes and Geuna, 
1999). 
 
III. A Single Europe for Science and Technology? 
The evidence confirms that in some vital areas of knowledge and competence-building Europe is 
lagging behind. Contrary to what happened for many periods since the end of the Second World War, in 
the 1990s Europe stopped decreasing its gap with the U.S. In the most recent years, Europe has increased 
its gap with Japan even more. While Europe is catching up in the diffusion of ICTs, its distance from the 
United States and Japan in terms of the generation of business innovation continues to be steady. It is 
therefore understandable that a major policy concern in Europe is identifying the strategies that would al-
low catching up and upgrading its scientific and technological competence. 
In addressing a European strategy for innovation, it should be remembered that the continent has 
vast regional disparities, and that they are much wider in terms of scientific and technological competen-
cies than in other aspects of economic life such as income, production or consumption. In the last fifteen 
years, Europe underwent major political changes that also affected its science and technology capabilities. 
Germany, which for a long time was the technological engine of Europe, has had to face a major regional 
problem: the integration of the East. The UK, soul of many centers of scientific excellence and the Euro-
pean country with the highest number of Nobel laureates, has underfunded its universities for more than   10
twenty years.
5 The 1995 enlargement has integrated into the EU three small and highly dynamic coun-
tries, Sweden, Finland and Austria, but the 2004 enlargement brought in ten countries without such a so-
phisticated dowry of scientific and technological infrastructures. The scientific community in Eastern 
Europe suffered hardship for many years, and the transition to capitalist economies has been particularly 
tough, given the academic competencies developed during the socialist regimes. Overall, EU25 has a lar-
ger population and an expanded market, but more vulnerable scientific and technological capabilities and 
a reduced R&D intensity. The peripheral areas, once confined to Southern Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, have now been extended to the East.  
The enormous differences across European member countries make it clear that fully exploiting 
the advantages of knowledge is crucial to developing strategies for the transmission and diffusion of com-
petencies across areas. Only by reducing regional disparities will it be possible to obtain overall European 
scientific and technological competence comparable those of the U.S. and Japan. A stronger integration 
among national policies, as well as between the academic and the business communities, is needed, which 
in turn requires major changes in the institutional setting and in the incentives existing in publicly funded 
research centers. 
We have seen that in Lisbon European governments committed themselves to transforming 
Europe into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, and that in Bar-
celona they set a more ambitious target of raising R&D expenditure up to 3 percent of GDP by 2010. At the 
same time, the business sector has been asked to contribute most of this effort, which, by 2010, should 
finance two-thirds of the total R&D expenditure (while in 2002 business-financed R&D in the EU25 was 
just 55.4 per cent, see OECD, 2004). 
It is self-evident that there is considerable divergence between the announcement of the political 
target and the instruments made available. Too little commitment has been made to reach such an ambi-
tious target, and it is certainly peculiar that governments (which have direct control of public expenditure) 
put the largest burden on the business community. The aim of 3 percent in the R&D/GDP ratio, moreover, 
appears very difficult to achieve without a major commitment of all the main economic players (national 
governments, European business community and EU institutions). For example, it implies an increase in 
research personnel of the magnitude of about 100,000 people a year, which seems difficult to realize with-
in the current EU qualified workforce (Schibany and Streicher, 2003). The Kok Commission (2004) has 
recently attempted a much-needed assessment of the targets set in Lisbon and Barcelona. The Report, on 
the basis of the recent evolution of the world economy, has urged national governments to increase their 
commitments, but there is a significant shift: understanding the Lisbon and Barcelona targets as “desir-
able” rather than “achievable.” 
Each country makes its own attempts to upgrade its scientific and technological potential, and 
certainly the achievements of any one of them are more likely to generate externalities that can be benefi-
cial for the whole European Union. The evidence reported in the paper clearly indicates that a small club 
of European countries has a scientific and technological intensity on a par with, and often superior to, to 
the U.S. one. The Scandinavian countries have followed a distinctive approach to competence-building 
based on: a) a highly competent and qualified labor force, generated through massive investments in edu-
cation and training; b) a specialization in high-tech industries, through R&D investments in ICT, biotech-
nology, and electronics; and c) close collaboration between the business sector on the one hand, and gov-
ernment and the academy on the other (European Commission, 2003). This model should inspire Euro-
pean policymaking much more than the American one, which is based on firms competing for market 
                                           
5In the second half of the 1990s, UK expenditure for tertiary education was stagnant and, in 1999, UK expenditure for tertiary 
education as a percentage of the GDP was lower than the EU15 average and half that of the U.S. See European Commission 
(2003), pp. 217-18.    11
share and public procurement and R&D public investment concentrated in national priorities such as de-
fense and space. 
There is also much to learn from the policies of individual nations. A small country like Ireland is 
managing to improve its technological potential by making the country attractive for multinational corpo-
rations and is slowly moving out from the group of the R&D-laggard countries. This is not the first time 
that European governments have preferred to follow an autonomous route to catching up, and when this 
has happened the whole EU has received indirect benefits. European nations are so linked to each other 
that science and technology outcomes and policies are bound to a common European faith. 
The most direct national route to achieving the Lisbon and Barcelona targets will be to increase 
governments’ financial commitments, but this conflicts, among other things, with the Maastricht parame-
ters on public expenditure. Indirect measures include tax incentives to industry, but it is doubtful what 
“leverage” effect they will display. Surely a greater effort from private sector is necessary, as is also dem-
onstrated by the low level of venture capital financing in Europe in comparison to the U.S. and Japan 
(European Commission, 2003). This form of financing is particularly significant for the promotion of in-
novative activities by small firms (the so-called start-ups). 
With regard to policies that can be directed from Brussels, there is an apparent trade-off between 
the use of resources for the diffusion of knowledge in the peripheral parts of the continental economy 
(widening) or for generating new knowledge in the core countries (deepening). The various Framework 
Programmes (FPs) have however partially managed to overcome this trade off. Through the FPs, the 
European Commission progressively revises and enlarges the areas of intervention enhancing intra-
European cooperation in the so-called pre-competitive research fields. This may serve the twin objectives 
of inducing learning in the peripheral areas and advancing knowledge in the core areas.
6 
In the last approved Sixth FP, the greatest bulk of resources has been dedicated to Informative 
Society Technology and Nano-technologies (4,925 million euro for the next four years). The strategic im-
portance of this sector has been recognized, not only for the new jobs and business that 3G wireless com-
munication systems, software architecture and opto-electronics networks can create, but also because it 
perfectly meets the request of “ambient intelligence,” that is, the target of linking economic growth and 
welfare purposes. The other “priority” research areas, biotechnology, environment and energy, are de-
voted to the same aim. 
If these actions are admirable, it is also true that the instruments in the hands of the European 
Commission are too limited. The ambitious targets will require a much larger commitment of national re-
sources in terms of the funding of existing centers of excellence (especially when they have been kept un-
der severe financial restriction), to generate the human resources needed for both the public and the busi-
ness institutions, to start up new problem-oriented institutions. Regulation, standards, procurement, com-
petition, real services and large-scale co-operative civilian projects seem to be essential instruments for 
creating a European Research Area in addition to the (limited) financial instruments (Lundvall, 2001). 
It is evident that successful management of the learning economy will require a much higher po-
litical commitment that should be comparable to the efforts European governments have devoted to cre-
                                           
6For a long time the meaning and effectiveness of pre-competitive research have been debated (Geuna, 2001). Financing research 
in one firm or one country could imply advantaging some organizations and to disadvantaging others, thus infringing the very 
same EU competition policy. But in the field of science and technology, the outcomes are likely to provide benefits to stake-
holders larger than those getting the funding. In fact, the European Commission funding schemes generally require the involve-
ment of firms and institutions from several member countries.  
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ating a single currency. Lundvall (2001) has suggested establishing a “European High Level Council on 
Innovation and Competence Building” chaired by the President of the EU and with at least as much po-
litical weight as the European Central Bank. This will be a clear sign in Europe that there is a political 
commitment to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” in a 
decade. But words without facts will only allow us to observe at the end of the decade that the aim of 
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USA EU 15 EU 25 Japan
Population 291,044,000 379,744,000 453,900,180 127,210,000
GDP in million current international US $ PPP  10,871,090 10,130,480 11,100,791 3,582,515
Gross Domestic R&D Expenditure in million current US $ PPP  277,100 189,464 198,596 106,838
Scientific and technical articles 228,015 277,403 296,646 64,073
Internet users 158,891,319 134,625,097 150,798,005 57,090,350
NOTE: PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the
same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.
Population and GDP refer to 2003, Gross Domestic R&D Expenditure and Internet users to 2002, Scientific articles to 2001.
Source: OECD Statistics, Main Science and Technology Indicators 2004-1 for Gross R&D expenditure; NSF 2004 for scientific articles; 
Worldbank, World Development Indicators 2004 for the other indicators.Table 2. Gross R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP by country, 2001-02 and 1996-97, 
and Business Expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP, 2002 and 1998.
GERD (% of 
GDP) in 2001-
2002
GERD (% of 
GDP) in 1996-
1997
Mean annual rate 
of growth from 
1996-97 to 2001-
02
BERD (% of 
GDP) in 
2002
BERD (% of 
GDP) in 
1998
Mean annual rate 
of growth from 
1998 to 2002
USA 2.71 2.57 1.1% 1.87 1.94 -0.9%
Japan 3.11 2.80 2.1% 2.32 2.10 2.5%
EU-15 1.89 1.81 0.9% 1.34 1.14 4.2%
EU-25 1.83 1.73 1.1% 1.17 1.08 2.0%
Austria 1.92 1.66 3.0% na 1.13 na
Belgium 1.99 1.84 1.6% 1.64 1.35 5.0%
Denmark 2.13 1.90 2.3% 1.75 1.33 7.1%
Finland 3.43 2.63 5.5% 2.41 1.94 5.6%
France 2.20 2.26 -0.5% 1.37 1.35 0.4%
Germany 2.50 2.28 1.9% 1.75 1.57 2.8%
Greece 0.65 0.51 5.0% 0.21 0.19 5.1%
Ireland 1.16 1.31 -2.4% 0.80 0.90 -2.9%
Italy 1.11 1.03 1.5% 0.55 0.52 1.4%
Netherlands 1.96 2.03 -0.7% 1.03 1.05 -0.5%
Portugal 0.81 0.62 5.5% 0.32 0.16 18.9%
Spain 0.90 0.83 1.6% 0.56 0.47 4.5%
Sweden 3.67 3.67 0.0% 3.32 2.74 10.1%
UK 1.87 1.86 0.1% 1.87 1.18 12.2%
Czech Republic 1.31 1.14 2.8% na na na
Estonia 0.60 0.57 1.0% na na na
Hungaria 0.99 0.69 7.5% 0.36 0.26 8.5%
Latvia 0.46 0.44 0.9% na na na
Lithuania 0.56 0.61 -1.7% na na na
Poland 0.64 0.71 -2.1% 0.13 0.28 -17.5%
Slovak Republic 0.90 0.93 -0.7% 0.37 0.52 -8.2%
Slovenia 1.54 1.43 1.5% na na na
Canada 1.81 1.69 1.4% 1.05 1.07 -0.5%
Norway 1.66 1.66 0.0% 0.96 0.92 1.4%
Switzerland 2.73 2.73 0.0% na na na
EU-15
Coeff of Variation 0.47 0.47 0.64 0.59
Max / Min 5.6 7.2 15.8 17.1
EU-25
Coeff of Variation 0.58 0.58 0.77 0.68
Max / Min 8.0 8.3 25.5 10.5
NOTE: As regards the second column, for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland we have 2001 data only; as regards the
third one, for Greece, Norway, Portugal and Sweden we have 1997 data only. Regarding the fifth column, data for  
Greece and Sweden refer to 2001; regarding the sixth one, data for Greece, Sweden and Norway refer to 1999.
The mean annual growth rates for BERD are adjusted to the effective number of years.
Source: OECD Statistics, Main Science and Technology Indicators 2004-1; Worldbank, World Development
Indicators 2004. Table 3. Patents granted at the USPTO and patents applied at the EPO by country, 2002-03 and
1997-98.
Mean annual 










rate of growth 
from 1996-97 to 
2000-01
Mean annual 
applied patents at 
EPO per million 
people 2002-03
Mean annual 
applied patents at 




rate of growth 
from 1996-97 to 
2000-01
USA 301                   260 3.0% 107                     80                      5.9%
Japan 277                   214 5.3% 135                     106                    5.1%
EU-15 71                     54 5.6% 136                     96                      7.3%
EU-25 59                     45 5.7% 114                     80                      7.4%
Austria 70                     48 7.8% 120                     88                      6.4%
Belgium 65                     59 1.9% 131                     94                      6.8%
Denmark 89                     68 5.3% 153                     105                    7.8%
Finland 161                   102 9.6% 297                     155                    13.8%
France 66                     57 3.1% 120                     92                      5.4%
Germany 138                   98 7.0% 265                     183                    7.7%
Greece 2                       1 8.1% 5                         3                        9.0%
Ireland 38                     20 13.8% 65                       41                      9.6%
Italy 30                     25 4.2% 61                       46                      5.6%
Luxembourg 81                     49 10.3% 350                     239                    7.9%
Netherlands 84                     65 5.3% 356                     217                    10.4%
Portugal 1                       1 3.6% 3                         2                        12.1%
Spain 7                       5 6.9% 16                       10                      9.0%
Sweden 179                   118 8.6% 287                     181                    9.7%
UK 63                     52 3.7% 81                       68                      3.5%
Cyprus 1                       1 -0.6% 29                       17                      11.4%
Czech Republic 4                       1 21.9% 5                         2                        16.8%
Estonia 3                       0 48.4% 3                         2                        3.7%
Hungary 6                       4 9.8% 6                         3                        13.1%
Latvia 1                       0 33.1% 1                         0                        9.4%
Lithuania 0                       1 -9.2% 0                         0                        9.1%
Malta 5                       3 14.1% 28                       8                        28.7%
Poland 0                       0 1.7% 1                         0                        22.1%
Slovak Republic 1                       0 22.9% 2                         1                        13.1%
Slovenia 9                       6 6.6% 19                       10                      14.5%
Canada 109                   77 7.3% 42                       21                      14.7%
Norway 55                     32 11.7% 70                       46                      8.7%
Switzerland 183                   155 3.3% 504                     352                    7.4%
EU-15
Coeff of Variation 0.73 0.69 0.78 0.74
Max / Min 158.3 124.9 103.5 123.2
EU-25
Coeff of Variation 1.20 1.16 1.22 1.20
Max / Min 487.9 574.4 821.0 853.0
Source: Our elaboration on US Patent and Trademark Office data and on European Patent Office data.Table 4. Scientific & technical articles by country, 2000-01 and 1995-96.
Number of scientific 
publication in 2000-01 per 
million people
Number of scientific 
publication in 1995-96 per 
million people
Mean annual rate of 
growth from 1995-96 to 
2000-01
USA 700                                     759                                     -1.6%
Japan 444                                     390                                     2.6%
EU-15 556                                     510                                     1.7%
EU-25 493                                     448                                     1.9%
Austria 548                                     446                                     4.2%
Belgium 571                                     534                                     1.3%
Denmark 927                                     847                                     1.8%
Finland 963                                     829                                     3.0%
France 527                                     510                                     0.7%
Germany 529                                     472                                     2.3%
Greece 294                                     207                                     7.3%
Ireland 425                                     343                                     4.4%
Italy 376                                     325                                     2.9%
Luxembourg 81                                       58                                       6.8%
Netherlands 784                                     800                                     -0.4%
Portugal 195                                     104                                     13.3%
Spain 374                                     300                                     4.5%
Sweden 1,133                                  1,074                                  1.1%
UK 824                                     805                                     0.5%
Cyprus 88                                       65                                       6.4%
Czech Republic 248                                     205                                     3.8%
Estonia 250                                     171                                     7.9%
Hungary 236                                     179                                     5.6%
Latvia 67                                       64                                       0.8%
Lithuania 76                                       52                                       8.1%
Malta 76                                       42                                       12.6%
Poland 143                                     118                                     3.8%
Slovak Republic 182                                     215                                     -3.3%
Slovenia 448                                     231                                     14.1%
Canada 736                                     832                                     -2.4%
Norway 716                                     675                                     1.2%
Switzerland 1,149                                  1,052                                  1.8%
EU-15
Coeff of Variation 0.51 0.57
Max / Min 14.0 18.5
EU-25
Coeff of Variation 0.73 0.82
Max / Min 17.0 25.4
NOTE:  In order to avoid double counting, article counts are based on fractional assignments; for example, 
 an article with  two authors from different countries is counted as one-half article to each country.
Source: Our elaboration from National Science Foundation (NSF) 2004,
data from Institute for Scientific Information (ISI).Table 5. ICT expenditure on GDP, 2001-02 and 1996-97.
ICT 
expenditure 




(% of GDP) 
1996-97
Mean annual rate 
of growth from 
1996-97 to 2001-
02
USA 7.2 7.7 -1.7%
Japan 7.5 6.9 2.2%
EU-15 6.5 5.7 3.4%
EU-25 6.5 5.6 4.1%
Austria 6.2 5.0 6.0%
Belgium 6.8 6.0 3.5%
Denmark 7.5 6.6 3.3%
Finland 6.7 6.0 3.2%
France 7.1 6.3 3.4%
Germany 6.5 5.4 4.9%
Greece 5.5 4.0 8.1%
Ireland 5.1 5.6 -2.3%
Italy 5.0 4.2 4.7%
Netherlands 7.2 6.8 1.5%
Portugal 6.1 4.9 6.0%
Spain 4.8 4.0 5.0%
Sweden 8.9 7.7 3.7%
UK 7.9 7.7 0.7%
Czech Republic 8.4 5.9 9.1%
Hungary 7.7 4.4 14.9%
Poland 5.6 2.5 22.7%
Slovak Republic 6.6 4.0 13.8%
Slovenia 4.8 3.3 10.2%
Canada 7.3 7.4 -0.2%
Norway 5.6 5.7 -0.3%
Switzerland 8.2 7.6 1.8%
EU-15
Coeff of Variation 0.17 0.21
Max / Min 1.86 1.95
EU-25
Coeff of Variation 0.18 0.27
Max / Min 1.86 3.14
Source: Worldbank, World Development Indicators 2004









rate of growth 
from 1997 to 
2002
USA 55.1% 22.1% 20%
Japan 44.9% 9.2% 37%
EU-15 35.5% 6.1% 42%
EU-25 33.3% 5.5% 44%
Austria 40.9% 9.4% 34%
Belgium 32.8% 4.9% 46%
Denmark 51.3% 11.4% 35%
Finland 50.9% 19.4% 21%
France 31.4% 4.3% 49%
Germany 41.2% 6.7% 44%
Greece 15.5% 1.9% 52%
Ireland 27.1% 4.1% 46%
Italy 35.2% 2.3% 73%
Luxembourg 37.0% 7.1% 39%
Netherlands 50.6% 14.1% 29%
Portugal 19.4% 5.0% 31%
Spain 15.6% 2.8% 41%
Sweden 57.3% 23.7% 19%
UK 42.3% 7.3% 42%
Cyprus 29.4% 5.1% 42%
Czech Republic 25.6% 2.9% 55%
Estonia 32.8% 5.5% 43%
Hungary 15.8% 2.0% 51%
Latvia 13.3% 2.0% 46%
Lithuania 14.4% 0.9% 74%
Malta 20.9% 4.0% 39%
Poland 23.0% 2.1% 61%
Slovak Republic 16.0% 1.9% 53%
Slovenia 37.6% 7.6% 38%
Canada 51.3% 15.5% 27%
Norway 50.3% 29.4% 11%
Switzerland 35.1% 7.7% 35%
EU-15
Coeff of Variation 0.35 0.75
Max / Min 3.70 12.47
EU-25
Coeff of Variation 0.42 0.87
Max / Min 4.31 26.33
Source: Worldbank, World Development Indicators 2004
(data from ITU).Table 7. Distribution of strategic technology alliances between and within economic blocs: 1980–2000.
Interregional alliances Intraregional alliances
Year Total Eur-Jap Eur-USA Jap-USA Subtotal Europe Japan USA Subtotal
number %age number %age number %age number %age number %age number %age
1980-82 203 16 7.9% 48 23.6% 43 21.2% 107 37 18.2% 9 4.4% 50 24.6% 96
1989-91 404 25 6.2% 101 25.0% 57 14.1% 183 74 18.3% 7 1.7% 140 34.7% 221
1998-00 542 19 3.5% 173 31.9% 38 7.0% 230 53 9.8% 11 2.0% 248 45.8% 312
Source: Our elaboration from National Science Foundation, 2002.Table 8. Propensities for strategic technical partnerships, 1980-2000.










Methodology: The number of strategic technological agreements recorded by 
the MERIT database have been divided by the Business Expenditure on R&D 
of the region expressed in constant 1992 purchasing power parity US billion $. 
It reads for example that in 1980-82 there have been 0.8 strategic technology 
agreements involving European firms for each US dollar billion of European BERD.
Source: Our elaboration from NSF, 2002 (data from MERIT database) and from
 OECD Statistics, Main Science and Technology Indicators 2001-2002.
0.32
Europe USA
Number of agreements involving US firms by BERD of the region (in 








Number of agreements involving European firms by BERD of the 
region (in billion US $ at constant dollars PPP)
Europe USA Japan
0.80 0.61 0.71
0.50 1.03 0.86Table 9. Percentage of internationally co-authored scientific papers in selected countries in all








rate from 1994 to 
2001
Annual growth 
rate from 1986 to 
1994
USA 23.2 15.8 9.2 5.6% 7.0%
Japan 19.7 13.7 7.5 5.3% 7.8%
Austria 50.8 39.9 25.2 3.5% 5.9%
Belgium 53.6 43.6 29.9 3.0% 4.8%
Denmark 50.6 39.8 24.4 3.5% 6.3%
Finland 42.9 32.4 18.7 4.1% 7.1%
France 43.3 32.5 21.0 4.2% 5.6%
Germany 41.7 30.6 20.1 4.5% 5.4%
Greece 41.5 37.4 26.6 1.5% 4.3%
Ireland 46.7 36.8 26.7 3.5% 4.1%
Italy 39.7 32.7 22.9 2.8% 4.6%
Netherlands 44.9 32.0 19.8 5.0% 6.2%
Portugal 53.0 46.1 34.8 2.0% 3.6%
Spain 37.9 29.1 17.0 3.8% 7.0%
Sweden 46.3 36.2 22.2 3.6% 6.3%
UK 36.9 25.1 15.7 5.7% 6.0%
Cyprus 66.9 71.7 14.3 -1.0% 22.3%
Czech Republic 51.6 42.9 17.2 2.7% 12.1%
Estonia 55.3 51.4 3.4 1.1% 40.4%
Hungary 54.8 48.7 29.0 1.7% 6.7%
Latvia 59.8 55.7 3.4 1.0% 41.8%
Lithuania 60.5 46.4 3.4 3.9% 38.6%
Poland 48.1 43.6 21.4 1.4% 9.3%
Slovak Republic 56.3 34.4 17.2 7.3% 9.1%
Slovenia 44.3 38.8 30.4 1.9% 3.1%
Canada 38.4 28.3 18.9 4.5% 5.2%
Norway 46.9 36.9 21.9 3.5% 6.8%
Switzerland 53.5 44.5 32.2 2.7% 4.1%
NOTE: National rates are based on total counts: each collaborating country is assigned one paper (a paper 
with three international coauthors may contribute to the international coauthorship of three countries). 
We could not calculate the EU total, as it would contain multiple counting.
Since in 1986 they were not yet created, we attributed to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the percentage of
URSS, as well as we attributed to Czech Republic and Slovak Republic the data of Czechoslovakia and to
Slovenia the percentage of Yugoslavia.
Source: Our elaboration from NSF 2004 (data from ISI).Table 10. Distribution of internationally coauthored papers across collaborating 
countries, 1986-88 and 1995-97.
(Rows report the percentage of the total number of international coauthorships of the country)
(Columns indicate the relative prominence of a country in the portfolio of internationally coauthored 
articles of every country) 
Country 1995-97 1986-88
USA Japan EU15 USA Japan EU15
USA 9,6 60.3 8,2 54.9
Japan 45.6 39.4 54.0 33.3
EU15 29.0 4.5 69.4 31.9 3.1 56.6
NOTE: Row %ages may add to more than 100 because articles are counted in each contributing 
country and some may have authors in 3 or more countries. 
With regard to European Union, internationally coauthored articles also include those among 
members countries.
Source: Our elaboration from NSF 2000, data from ISI.